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For the typical socialist firm, the transition to a market economy is an
unexpected shock in its economic environment. The monopoly position
established by the governmental demarcation of the industry and enforced
by the international coordination "of specialization in the Comecon, is lost.
Competition is the rule of the game, and product quality matters. The
system of subsidies is abandoned and access to new capital is no longer
possible through a "soft budget restraint", but capital has to be attracted
competitively from the capital market. Demand and producer's price fall
abruptly, and the existing capital stock becomes obsolete to a large
extent.
The stylised fact concerning the socialist firm in transition to a market
economy are
- Without adjustments, the firm cannot survive because it now faces
tougher competition, and its technology is outmoded.
- Adjustments require investment in modern capital equipments, and
possibly the disposal of old equipments.
- It may be neccessary to reduce the work force, at least during some
initial phase of adjustment.
We attempt to capture these stylised facts in a simple model of
adjustment in which the firm experiences a price shock. We show that the
optimal time path of investment may involve an initial phase of sharply
rising investment, to be followed by a second phase where investment is
positive but gradually slows down to its steady state value. Under certain
conditions, the adjustment calls for a quantum upward jump in the capital
stock. This quantum jump may occur after an initial phase of gradual
accumulation of capital. Old equipments are either left to decay, or
scrapped. In the latter case, a quantum downward jump in the stock of
old equipment may be optimal. The aggregate stock of capital may
therefore at first fall, then rise. Like output, the aggregate capital stock
will follow a J-curve.
Since for a given quantity of labour a higher capital stock increases
the marginal product of labour, the labour force will be adjusted optimally- 2 -
to maintain the equality of its marginal product with the real wage if the
wage rate is flexible. Taking into account the initial overmanning or
hidden unemployment of the socialist firm, a J-shaped time path of the
aggregate capital stock of the firm does not imply a J-shaped time path of
labour employment, but a u-curve where the initial level of employment
may not be reached again. If wages rise as in the German case, the
exogenous increase in the wage rate will lead to a lower capital stock and
will affect the viability of the firm.
We also explore the effects of fiscal incentives (such as investment
subsidies and a reduced corporate income tax rate) on the time path of
adjustment and on the steady state capital stock of the firm. We show
that an investment subsidy will - unsurprisingly - increase the steady
state capital stock. The effects of a reduction in the corporate tax rate
are ambiguous, however. If we impose certain reasonable assumptions on
tax allowance for depreciation, then a fall in the corporate tax rate has
similar effects to those of an investment subsidy.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the
assumptions and notation. Section 3 is concerned with the simplest case,
where new equipments are m times more productive than old equipments,
and where adjustment costs are so steep that jumps in the capital stock
are never optimal. Section 4 modifies the assumptions on adjustment costs
and derives the optimal conditions for upward jumps in the capital stock.
In Section 5, we relax the assumption that new equipments are simply m
times more productive than old ones. The J curve effect is discussed in
that section. Whether firms are viable, is a core problem for the
restructuring of industry and for the privatization issue (Section 6).
Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
The firm is assumed to be a price-taker. The change in its
environment is modelled as a sudden drop in the price of its output, and
also the availability of more expensive, but more efficient, modern
equipments.- 3 -
Before the transition to a market economy, the firm did not have
access to modern equipments, and its production function ^as
Q = F(K0, L)
where
Let
K = the capital stock embodying the old technology,
L = the firm's labour force.
p = price of the output
p = price of a unit of K
r = interest rate
••-.. w = wage rate
6 . = rate of physical depreciation of K .
We assume that the output price has fallen so sharply that the firm
cannot remain viable unless it modernizes its capital stock:
Max f PF(K0, L) - wL - po(tf+r)K y<Q •.,- V M
where (<5+r)p_ is the implicit rental rate on the old equipments.
New equipments are more efficient than old ones. The simplest way to
capture this fact is to assume that one unit of new equipment is m times
more efficient than its old counterpart. We then can aggregate the capital
stock «
K = KQ + mKN (2)
where KN is the stock of new equipment. In (2), K is measured in
efficiency units. The production function can then be written as
Q = FdCQ+mKjj, L) (3)
A more general approach would be to assume that the efficiency
measure of K^, is non-linear, and the aggregate capital stock is
K = KQ + hd^) (2')- 4 -
where MFLJ is non-linear, and h'(KM) > m. Since formulation (2) is
much simpler than (2'), most of our analysis relies on (2), until Section
5, where the implications of (2') are explored.
Let I., and I- be gross investments in the two capital stocks IC, and
K_ respectively, so that
KN
K = I. - 4K . I i 0. (5)
0 0 0 0
The cost of purchasing equipments are p^ and p_ per unit. We assume
that
P« < P»T < nip. (6)
*0 *N
 H0
to reflect the fact that new equipments are more expensive, but also more
economical (i.e. cheaper in terms of efficiency unit).
In addition to the cost of purchasing equipments, there are also
internal adjustment costs caused by any change in the firm's aggregate
capital stock. We denote these adjustments costs by
C = g(K) = g(K0+mKN) (7)
Following Treadway (1969), Rothschild (1971) and Milne (1977) we take it
that in the typical case the adjustment cost function has the following
properties:
g(0) = 0, g'(0) = 0 (8a)
g'(K) > 0 if K > 0 (8b)
g'(K) < 0 if K < 0 (8c)
g"(K) > 0. <8d)
• 2 The quadratic function g(K) = K satisfies all these properties. Note that
(7) and (8) imply that adjustment costs depend on the level of net- 5 -
investment. An alternative formulation would be to make adjustment costs
dependent on the ratio of investment to the capital stock; see Hayashi
(1982) and Auerbach (1989). Our model can be readily adopted to
accommodate this alternative specification, without substantial changes in
results.
In order to focus on the investment behaviour of the firm, we assume
that the firm can adjust its labour force without cost. It follows that at
each point of time, the size of the labour force is chosen to equate the
marginal productivity of labour with the real wage rate. For example, if
the production function is
„• -, F(K, L) = r(K)K'V"
a (O<0<1, 0<a<l) (9)







Gross profit (before taking into account the cost of capital) is





Here r(K) represents a shift in the production function K L
 a, and
suitable assumptions on r(K) would make IT have interesting properties. In
what follows, we assume that TT is at first convex, then concave in K, and
that its derivative -nv has the bell shape. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the
is.
shape of IT and TT^..- 6 -
FIGURE A
FIGURED- 7 -
We now turn to taxation, because one of our objectives is to
investigate the effects of tax incentives on the adjustment path of the
firm.
Following Auerbach (1989), we simplify matters by ignoring personal
taxes, and corporate interest deductibility. Let s^, > 0 denote the subsidy
per unit of gross investment in new equipments, the total cost of capital





The tax bill at date s is
Ts
 = V









where 9 is the corporate tax rate, JJL is the investment tax credit, and s s
D(s, s-u) is the depreciation allowance at date s per dollar of date u
capital expenditures. This formulation closely resembles that of Auerbach
(1989).
The firm maximizes the value of the discounted stream of cash flow.
- T ]ds (14)
s
where r is the after tax cost of capital. Following Auerbach, this




t)[(l-9 )TT - B (1-JJL -G )]ds + Av (15)
t J sssss t
where A is independent of decisions made at (or after) time t:









and G is the value of the discounted stream of tax deduction per dollar s
of date s capital expenditures:- 8 -
G = e
 v ' 9 D(u, s-u)du (17)
s I u s
As a special case, consider the following constant proportional
depreciation allowance rule, where u-s is the age of the machine:
D(u, u-s) = D(u-s) = be"
(U"
S)C, b>0, c>0 (18)
If 9 is a constant, 9, then substituting (18) into (17) gives:
G = 0b/(r+c) (19)
s
3. THE STEEP ADJUSTMENT COST CASE
We now derive the optimal path of adjustment under the assumption
that the adjustment cost function is strictly convex for all K and in
particular
lim g(K)/K = oo (20)
K-oo
This assumption implies that the adjustment cost is so steep that it is
never optimal to have a very high rate of investment. (Technically, as is
shown by Milne (1977), this rules out upward jumps in the capital stock. )
The firm's optimization problem can now be stated as follows: Find L. £ 0
and IQ > 0 that maximize
00
e~
rt[(l-9)TT(K, p, w) - (l-|x-G)B]dt (21)
subject to
K = IQ + mIN - dK (22)
IQ > 0, IN > 0 (23)
In (21), we have assumed that 0,ii, and G are constant from the present
time (t=0) onwards, and we have used B to denote the total capital






Let ip denote the shadow price of capital, and let
CJ = 1 - JJL - G. (25)
The Hamiltonian is then
H = (1-9)TI(K) - u[(pN-sN)IN + p0IQ + g(I0+mIN-(5K)]
(26)
where the dependence of v on p and w has been suppressed for simplicity
of notation. The first order conditions are
0 -o(p0 + g') + ip < 0 (27a)
IQ > 0, IQ(aH/ai0) - 0 (27b)
N = -"(PN - sN + mg*) + imp < 0 (28a)
IN i/0, IN(aH/3lN) = 0 (28b)
•V = rip - dH/dK = ip(r+d) - codg'(K) - (1-9)TT (29)
K - aH/aip = I + mIN - dK (30)
It follows from (27) and (28) that IQ = 0 always. This is because a
positive I,, would imply ip = cj(pf,+g'), and this condition together with (6)
would yield
imp > cj(pN+mg' )
which would contradict (28a).
From (28) and the fact that In = 0, we deduce that
(a) IN = 0 if ip < o[(l/m)(pN-sN) + g'(-dK)] (31)
(b) Otherwise, I is given by
g'(mIN-<JK) - (l/m)(sN-pN) + (ip/w) (32)- 10 -
Figure 3 depicts some I., = constant loci. Notice that 1=0 in the
region to the left of the curve
o[(l/m)(pN-sN)
The K = 0 curve is obtained by setting !„ = 6K. Using (32) and the fact
that g'(0) = 0, it is clear that this locus is the horizontal line
•H = (o/m)(pN-sN)
 :
if K > 0, and is the vertical line segment defined by
{(K, ip) : K = 0, 0 < Tp < (o/m)(pN-sN)}











Turning now the ip = 0 locus, it is convenient to draw the reference
curve
= (l-6)TTK/(d+r) (33)
There are two cases:- 11 -
Case 1... (l-e)7TK(0)/(d+r) > (o/m)(pN-sN>
Case 2: (1-9)^(0) / (d+r) < (u/m)(p -sN)
(34)
(35)
In case 1, the curve (33) cuts the locus K = 0 only once, at K*, as
illustrated in Figure 4. In the region above the line ip = (o/m)(pN-sN), K
is positive, and so is g'(K). It follows from (29) that the ip = 0 locus lies
above [respectively, below] the reference curve (33) for all values of K
to the left [respectively, right] of K*. It can be checked that the
equilibrium point (K*. Tp*), where y* = (u/m) (p^-s.^), is a saddle-point.
The phase diagram (Figure 4) shows (and this can be confirmed) that all
paths in the region to the left of the ip = 0 curve and below the K = 0
line will hit the horizontal axis at some K > 0 in finite time and
afterwards ip becomes negative. These paths cannot be optimal. Similarly,
one can rule out paths that lead to infinite value of either K or ip. It






A possible depiction of the adjustment of the socialist firm is the path
QRR'S in Figure 4. As soon as the firm receives a shock due to a sharp
fall in the price of its output, the value of its capital immediately falls
from Q to R. But the firm now has access to the market for modern- 12 -
equipments. It therefore accumulates capital. Along RR' the rate of
investment is increasing over time. Afterwards net investment remains
positive, but its rate of change may be negative. The path approaches
the steady state S asymptotically. Note that the shadow price ip rises
temporarily from R to R' (Figure 4; Figure Al in the appendix). This is
due to the role of adjustment costs and to the bell shape curve for the
marginal productivity of capital (Figure 2). Without adjustment costs and
without the positive impact of new capital on productivity as in equation 3
(or 2'), ip should fall after the jump.
Case 2 is rather more complicated, because there are three stationary
points for (ip, K) (see appendix).
A typical time path of net cash flow associated with the optimal
adjustment path is depicted in Figure 5a where tn is the time of the
shock. Due to investment outlays, period net cash flow is negative for
some initial time interval, but it eventually becomes positive in the case of
a viable firm.
Employment falls abruptly in tQ. If adjustment pays off, employment
will pick up. From equation 10, the demand for labour is positively
related to K and p. At tQ, p falls by a sudden jump (Figure 5b). This
means that L has a downward jump. Afterwards, as capital is
accumulated, labour demand grows too (for the case of the viable firm;
curve a in Figure 5b). For non-viable firms, immediate shut down implies












The implications of tax incentives can now be explored. Consider the
steady state capital stock K* of Figure 4 (or K« of Figure Al or A2 in
the appendix). It is determined by the equation
(l-M.-G)[(pN-sN)/m] = (l-9)TTK(K*)/((5+r) (36)
Clearly, an increase in the investment tax credit u or in the subsidy
rate on investment goods, sN, will result in a higher steady state capital- 14 -
stock, because the K = 0 locus is shifted down. In fact, such a tax
«
change may transform case 2 into case 1, if the K = 0 locus is shifted
down far enough. Thus, a firm that is reducing its capital along /3 of
Figure Al or A2 in the appendix may, as a result of the above tax
incentives, reverse its direction and aim at attaining the capital stock K*
of Figure 4.
The effect of a reduction in the corporate tax rate 9 may or may not
encourage capital accumulation. Take for example the case of proportional
depreciation allowance given by (19). Substituting this into (36), we see
that
«5+r)[(pN-sN)/m] ^[ d-M-f^T) / d-6) ] (37)
Thus, if M- = 0 and b = r+c, then the change in the corporate tax rate
has no effect on the steady state stock of capital. This is essentially the
Samuelsonian neutrality result: if the present value of tax claims on
depreciation allowance of a dollar of investment is 6, that is, if




where a is the "age" of the machine (The "age" is by definition zero at
the time of investment), then the corporate tax rate has no effects on the
steady state capital stock (in fact it has no effects on the path of
accumulation, as can be seen from the objective function (21), when JJL = 0
and G = 0).






because of the typical tax law requirement that the sum of non-discounted
claims on a dollar equal a dollar:
00
6e~
 ada =1 (a = u-s) (40)- 15 -
If (39) applies, then, as is clear from (37), a reduction in corporate tax
rate 9 will increase the steady state capital stock K*.
4.-THE BIG PUSH
Assumption (20) of section 4 prevents upward jumps in the capital
stock. We now relax that assumption, and postulate instead
lim g(K)/K = A (A > 0 and finite) (41)
K-oo
Under these conditions, a jump in the capital stock may occur.
Drawing on the results reported in Long and Vousden (1977), Milne
(1977) and Leonard and Long (1991, Chapter 10), the conditions
characterizing the jump can be identified. The per unit cost of the jump
is o[A + (l/m)(pN-sN) ]. The shadow price ip remains continuous at all
time, and if t. denotes the time of the jump, we must have
co[A + (l/m)(pN-sN)] > ip , all t (42)
co[A + (l/m)(pN-sN)] = Tp(tj) (43)
The size of the jump, K(t.) - K(t.) is determined by the condition
-
rtJ + +
e . (H[K(tJ), Wtj)] - H[K(tJ),
j ~)] J£ [e"
rt(A+(l/m)(pN-sN))] (44)
In our problem, pN and sN are constant for all t i 0, and (44) reduces
to
•H[K(tj), Tp(tj)] - H[K(t~), Tp(tj)] -
ro[A+(l/m)(pN-sN)][K(tj) - K(t~)] (45)
It is well known that H = rV, where V is the value of the discounted
stream of future cash flow. Hence condition (45) says that the increase in
the value of the firm is equal to the cost of the jump.- 16 -
In Figure 6, we depict the case of an upward jump after some initial
gradual adjustment. Arrow and Kurz (1970, p. 57), drawing on the work
of Vind (1967), stated that in strictly concave problems any jump must
occur at the initial instant. Our problem, however, is not strictly




5. A MORE GENERAL FORMULATION OF THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we have made a number of simplifying
assumptions so that a detailed analysis using phase diagram is possible. A
more general formulation would have to relax these assumptions. In
particular, firms may expect that the time path of investment subsidy rate
to be non-stationary. For example, at first, there may be no subsidy
because of polk,/ inertia, then a rising subsidy due to concern about
unemployment, and finally a decline in subsidy after most firms have made
their full adjustment. Another generalisation would be to relax the
assumption that new capital equipments and old ones are linear- 17 -
substitutes. As a modest step in this direction, we define the aggregate
capital stock as
K = KQ + hd^) (46)
where h(KN) is an increasing and concave function, and h'dCJ > m > 1
for all ICj. The stock K is measured in efficiency units. From (46)
K = KQ + h'd^)!^ , (47)
and we can postulate an adjustment cost function
C = g(K) = g[I0 - (5K0 + h'd^M^ - 6¥^)] (48)
To capture the fact that new capital is more cost efficient than old







The control problem now involves two state variables, K_ and K^,
because they are no longer linearly related. Let H>~ and i|>N be the
associated shadow prices, the Hamiltonian is






The necessary conditions can then be derived in the usual way, and it
is easy to show that 1^ = 0 always. The possibility of a J curve for the
time path of the firm's aggregate capital stock is depicted in Figure 7.
The dark curves are the "iso-capital" curves, along any such curve,
aggregate capital is a constant. The slope of these curves exceeds m.
The dotted curve with arrows is a possible time path. The firm's
aggregate capital stock at first falls, then rises, as the firm first
concentrates on getting rid of old equipments, then begins to emphasize
investment in new equipments. The time path of employment would follow
a J curve in that case.- 18 -
FIGURE 7
KN
6. THE VIABILITY ISSUE
A core issue in the adjustment of firms and in the restructuring of
industry is whether a firm is viable. Viability should be defined in terms
of the present value of the stream of net cash flow. The value V of the
firm at time T is defined as the result of the maximization problem in
~rt —r(t—T)
equation (21), with 0 replaced by T and e replaced by e . If the
capital stock is owned completely by the firm, i. e. if there is no
outstanding debt, then the viability condition is
V > 0.
T (51)
If the capital stock is not completely owned by the firm because of debt
financing and R (s K ) stands for the stock of debt at time T, then
viability requires that the net value N of a firm is positive, i. e.
N * 0. (52)
The value of the firm is increased by an increase in the investment
tax credit (or in the subsidy rate on investment goods), a reduction in- 19 -
the corporate tax rate and through depreciation allowances of the type
specified in (39).
The value of the firm is also affected by the wage rate. Consider an





e if t < t < t
(h > 0)
 X
w if t > t , when w = w(t )e
(53)
where t1 is the exogenous time at which the wage is expected to stop
rising. Note that the wage cannot rise forever, unless we have continual
technological progress and we have not assumed this, for simplicity.
It would be difficult to incorporate the above wage equation into the
main analysis, because phase diagrams like Figures 4 or 6 cannot be
drawn when the wage is time-dependent. However, certain inference can
be made from equation 53.
If h is positive (h>0) - i.e. there is a wage rise - then the profit
function will be shifted downwards, and the marginal contribution of
capital to profit will be lower (see for example, equation 11). So h>0
implies a lower capital stock in the long run equilibrium. The viability of
the firm is affected. This can be calculated using the "dynamic envelope
theorem" of Caputo (1990), and Lafranee and Barney (1991). From (21):
0
Thus, the value of the firm is reduced when wages rise. The time path of
employment will be lower, the higher the wage increase h.
. A wage subsidy increases the value of the firm. Note, however, that
the analysis assumes the wage (or the wage increase) as given and does
not consider the moral hazard problem of a wage subsidy on the
bargaining behavior of trade unions.- 20 -
If old debt is forgiven, viability of the firm is enhanced; this also
holds if the government takes over environmental damages of the past
such as cleaning up contaminated soil or liabilities for health risks of
previously employed workers.
In the transition process to a market economy the issue arises under
what conditions firms have to be shut down. Consider a situation in which
old debts are forgiven and in which environmental damages of the past
are taken over by the government. Then, the base line for shutting down
a firm is that the value of the firm after adjustment is negative^ i: e
V <0. Government and government agencies such as Treuhand do not
have sufficient information on the value of the firm. Consequently,
governments must determine the value of the firm (or of parts of the
firm) in the market of firms. If a firm cannot be sold to a private
investor and if the market of selling firms is reasonably efficient, there'
is reason to expect that the firm has to be closed down.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS =
It is important to understand that the adjustment of the socialist firm
and the transition from central planning to a market economy is a
phenomenon of shock, a problem of dynamic change and of transformation
or of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter 1934). This implies an
intertemporal analysis with some discontinuity. A comparative-static
analysis or the approach of allocative distortions may not do sufficient
justice to the transition problem.
In modelling the transformation problem, we have simplified by
analysing a price shock. Other important aspects of the shock have been
neglected. Ownership, corporate control and removing the nomenklatura
are important issues. Privatization methods are a core problem.
The shock to the typical socialist firm can be modelled more richly
than a price shock including a more comprehensive change in the
restraints such as competing for new capital in the capital market instead
of facing a soft budget constraint, losing subsidies and explicitly allowing- 21 -
for the change in the market position. In addition, the adjustment process
could be modelled more richly, not only including new capital (and
technology) and laying off workers but developing new products,
redefining in-house and out-house production of intermediate inputs,
building up a new distribution system, marketing the products etc.
Finally, the model of the adjustment of the socialist firm can be used
to portray the transition of the total economy in aggregating the picture
derived from a set of firms. This would allow to develop a model of
dynamic change of an economy. In such a context, a taxanomy of firms
with respect to viability must be developed, sectorial conditions can be
considered, and the adjustment cost function can be specified. Adjustment
costs may be high initially, for instance due to ownership uncertainty, a
lacking infrastructure and a deficient administration. Over time, these
bottlenecks will be reduced and the adjustment cost function shifts
downward. Moreover, in an aggregate picture of the adjustment process,
one cannot only study the adjustment of existing firms but must analyze
the birth of new firms and the conditions that forster their creation and
their development.- 22 -
APPENDIX
In case 2 (equation 35), there are three stationary points for (ip, K).
These are [0, (l-e)irK(0)/(d+r) ], [ Kr (o/m) <PN~sN) ], and
[ K«, (cj/m) (p^-s^) ]. See Figure Al. The stationary point at K_ is a
saddle-point. The one at K.. is either an unstable mode (Figure Al) or a
spiral (Figure A2). Using an argument similar to that of Skiba (1978), it
can be shown that there are two critical values K. and KR such that if
K(0) > KR, then it is optimal to take the path a (the stable branch
leading to the saddle-point at K~), and if K(0) < K. then it is optimal to
let the capital stock depreciate, taking the system along path /3 to the
equilibrium with a zero capital stock.
A1
R=0
KA K2 K- 23
A 2
K2 K
Skiba's arguments can be adapted to establish that there exists a
critical value K« somewhere between K. and K,., such that starting from
the right of K_., one should take path a, while path 15 is optimal for any
initial capital "stock below Kc- The path QRR'S in Figure Al and A2 has
the same properties as that of Figure 4.- 24 -
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